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Key Points: 
•	 Organised crime and illicit economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. Yet, 
goals such as a complete suppression of organised crime may sometimes be unachievable, 
especially in the context of acute state weakness where underdeveloped and weak state insti-
tutions are the norm.
•	 Zero-tolerance approaches to drugs and crime, popular around the world since the late 1980s, 
have often proven problematic. They have often failed to suppress criminality while increasing 
human rights violations and police abusiveness.
•	 Focused-deterrence strategies, selective targeting, and sequential interdiction efforts are being 
increasingly embraced as more promising law enforcement alternatives. 
•	 These approaches seek to minimise the most pernicious behaviour of criminal groups, such as 
engaging in violence, or to maximise certain kinds of desirable behaviour sometimes exhibited by 
criminals, such as eschewing engagement with terrorist groups. 
•	 Focused-deterrence and selective targeting strategies enable overwhelmed law enforcement in-
stitutions to overcome certain under-resourcing problems.
•	 How ‘the most pernicious’ group is defined or what is designated as ‘the most harmful’ behaviour 
to be deterred can vary. The broad concept is to move law enforcement forces away from random 
non-strategic strikes and blanket ‘zero-tolerance’ approaches against lowest-level offenders, and 
toward strategic selectivity to give each counter-crime operation enhanced impact.
•	 Whether	 to	 focus	 selective	 interdiction	 on	 high-value	 targets	 or	 the	 middle	 layer	 of	 criminal	
groups is importantly related to whether incapacitation or deterrence strategies are privileged 
and what focus and objective they have.
•	 The focused-deterrence approaches and prioritised-interdiction concepts are to a great extent 
derived from Boston’s fight against violent gangs in the early 1990s. Similar strategies, as well 
as transnational versions of focused-deterrence approaches, have been adopted elsewhere in 
the world.
•	 Factors that impact the level of effectiveness of focused-deterrence strategies and selective in-
terdiction include the political context, the level of pre-existing intelligence and enforcement ca-
pacity of the government, the government’s capacity to concentrate resources, the size and scale 
of criminality, the complexity of and power distribution in the criminal market, and the structure of 
criminal groups.
•	 Careful monitoring of the effectiveness and side effects of these strategies is necessary, although 
evaluating their effectiveness presents difficult inferential problems and threats to validity.
∗	Senior	Fellow,	The	Brookings	Institution,	Washington,	DC
2Introduction
Extensive criminality and illicit economies 
generate multiple, at times intense, threats to 
states and societies – to their basic security 
and safety, and to their economic, justice, 
and environmental interests. High levels of 
criminality, particularly criminal violence, tend 
to eviscerate law enforcement capacities as well 
as the social capital and organisational capacity 
of civil society and its ability to resist organised 
crime. Especially in the context of acute state 
weakness where underdeveloped and weak 
state institutions are the norm, goals such as a 
complete suppression of organised crime may be 
unachievable. But even in countries with strong 
law enforcement institutions, law enforcement 
efforts to suppress the incidence of criminality, 
particularly of transactional crimes, such as drug 
trafficking (as opposed to predatory crimes, 
such as homicides) have at times not succeeded 
and have generated negative side effects and 
externalities, such as human rights and civil 
liberties violations and overcrowded prisons.
Zero-tolerance approaches to crime, popular 
around the world since the late 1980s, have 
often proven problematic. They have produced 
highly unequal outcomes and often greater 
police abusiveness. Particularly, in the context 
of weak law enforcement institutions and high 
criminality, zero-tolerance approaches have 
mostly failed to reduce crime, while generating 
new problems. Allocating resources to 
essentially repressive programmes frequently 
takes place at the expense of investigative 
capacity. Critically, the lack of prioritisation of 
crimes and criminal groups often diverts police 
focus from the most violent and serious offenses 
and most dangerous criminal groups.
Focused-deterrence strategies, selective 
targeting, and sequential interdiction efforts are 
being increasingly embraced as more promising 
law enforcement alternatives. They seek to 
minimise the most pernicious behaviour of 
criminal groups, such as engaging in violence, or 
to maximise certain kinds of desirable behaviour 
sometimes exhibited by criminals, such as 
eschewing engagement with terrorist groups. 
The focused-deterrence, selective targeting 
strategies also enable overwhelmed law 
enforcement institutions to overcome certain 
under resourcing problems. Especially, in the 
United States, such approaches have produced 
impressive results in reducing violence and 
other harms generated by organised crime 
groups and youth gangs. Such approaches 
have, however, encountered implementation 
difficulties elsewhere in the world.
This report first outlines the logic and problems 
of zero-tolerance and undifferentiated 
targeting in law enforcement policies. Second, 
it lays out the key theoretical concepts of law-
enforcement strategies of focused-deterrence 
and selective targeting and reviews some of 
their applications, as in Operation Ceasefire 
in Boston in the 1990s and urban-policing 
operations in Rio de Janeiro during the 2000s 
decade (See Box 1). Third, the report analyses 
the implementation challenges selective 
targeting and focused-deterrence strategies 
have encountered, particularly outside of the 
United States. And finally, it discusses some key 
dilemmas in designing selective targeting and 
focused-deterrence strategies to fight crime.
The logic and difficulties of 
zero-tolerance, undifferentiated 
targeting, and resource 
dispersion of anti-crime policies
Under ideal circumstances, police forces would 
be responding in a uniform and standardised 
way to all criminal groups participating in 
the same type of illicit economic activity. In 
order to prevent corruption and capture of the 
law enforcement apparatus by one criminal 
group or the development of political linkages 
among certain criminal groups, political parties, 
and the state,1 and to ensure equitable and 
accountable application of rule of law, the 
3state’s law enforcement forces would respond 
to any criminal activity and target all criminal 
groups. According to this model, a policy 
of differentiating among criminal groups 
or responding less harshly to some illegal 
economies could encourage the spread of anti-
social values and undermine the internalisation 
of the rule-of-law values. 
Such logic is at the core of one of the driving 
concepts of criminal justice developed in the 
United States over the past thirty years, the so-
called “broken windows” theory.2 This approach 
holds that controlling crime requires dealing 
with even minor crime disturbances, in order to 
communicate to society and potential offenders 
that a space is being effectively monitored 
and that police do have the capacity and will to 
enforce the law. This theoretical concept has 
underlain New York City’s aggressive policing 
approach even to minor offenses since the early 
1990s – even though its intrinsic effectiveness as 
well as comparative effectiveness with respect to 
other policing innovations and methods (such as 
problem-oriented policing and crime mapping) 
have been hotly contested among scholars.3 
In many Latin American countries, especially 
in reaction to public outcry against the rise of 
crime, the concept of aggressively responding 
to all crime was adopted and took the form of 
mano dura (‘strong hand’) approaches. Among 
other measures, mano dura policies criminalised 
membership in youth gangs, on the assumption 
that this would discourage gang membership and 
street crime and reduce organised crime as well.4
Yet the aggressively-combat-all-crime approach 
has proven ineffective in the Latin American 
context. Indeed, elsewhere around the world 
too, zero-tolerance approaches have often 
produced highly unequal outcomes, failed to 
reduce crime, and generated new challenges. 
The wide dragnets and extensive imprisonment 
of essentially low-level criminals for even minor 
misdemeanours often floods the prisons without 
an accompanying boost in the capacity of the 
corrections system. As a result, prisons become 
breeding grounds for hardened criminals. 
Zero-tolerance approaches have frequently 
been accompanied by significant human rights 
violations and abusive policing practices, 
alienating communities from police forces. The 
allocation of resources to essentially repressive 
programmes frequently takes place at the expense 
of law enforcement’s investigative capacity.
Critically, the lack of prioritisation of crimes and 
criminal groups often diverts police focus from 
the most violent and serious offenses and most 
dangerous criminal groups. An explosion of 
crime can quickly overwhelm police forces and 
result in their becoming apathetic or favourably-
disposed to extrajudicial measures, including by 
vigilante groups and militias.
 
During	intense	warfare	among	criminal	groups,	
such as experienced in Mexico over the past 
decade,5 an undifferentiated targeting of 
organised crime groups can further intensify 
violence. By preventing the establishment of 
stable turfs and balances of power among the 
powerful criminal groups, it can perpetuate 
cycles of violence beyond the control of the 
law enforcement agencies. Unlike in Colombia 
in the 1990s, when Mexican President Felipe 
Calderón decided to take on Mexico’s drug 
trafficking groups, the Mexican drug market did 
not have a ‘bipolar’ structure of being dominated 
by two most powerful groups, as was the case in 
Colombia. Instead, there were at least six large 
drug	 trafficking	organisations	 (DTOs).	Mexican	
law	 enforcement	 actions	 against	 the	 DTOs	
weakened them but did not clearly transfer 
power to either the state or another criminal 
group. Instead, the state’s actions disturbed the 
balance	 of	 power	 among	 the	 DTOs	 and	 their	
ability to control territory and smuggling routes 
and project power to deter challengers. This 
lack of clarity about the balance of power on 
the	criminal	market	tempted	the	DTOs	to	try	to	
take over one another’s territory and engage in 
internecine warfare. It also produced highly fluid 
and unstable alliances among them. Continuing 
hits	by	the	state	against	the	DTOs	without	much	
prioritisation also led to the splintering of the 
DTOs,	 giving	 rise	 to	 many	 new	 offshoots	 and	
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the fight to survive and expand their power and 
territorial control. Many have also diversified 
their operations into other illegal rackets and 
extortion. The groups may be smaller but the 
criminal market is far more violent.6
The larger the geographic area inflamed in 
violence, the harder law enforcement finds 
it to effectively respond. Spreading even 
considerable resources over extensive areas 
in a scattershot way fails to improve security 
in a lasting way in any area, and in a reactive 
uncoordinated fashion, law enforcement 
often ends up chasing the latest escalation of 
violence. The thinner resources are spread, the 
lesser any leftover deterrence capacity of law 
enforcement becomes. 
 
Focused-deterrence strategies 
and selective targeting in law 
enforcement: Key concepts and 
evidence 
To overcome the problems of resource intensity, 
dispersion of resources, and police abusiveness, 
law enforcement forces can adopt an alternative 
approach – namely, selectively focusing on 
punishing or incapacitating a chosen criminal 
group or a chosen type of offender either in a 
particular locale or the entire country with the 
goal of deterring other criminal groups or actors 
throughout the system from engaging in the 
designated harmful behaviour.7 In a similar vein, 
law enforcement can focus on hotspots of crime 
or chronic offenders.8 The underlying logic of 
these anti-crime focused deterrence strategies, 
increasingly popular in the United States 
and	 Western	 Europe,	 is	 that	 law	 enforcement	
interventions against a specifically selected type 
of offender or criminal group – whether by limited 
punishment or comprehensive incapacitation – 
will alter the behaviour of either the group itself or, 
if the group is altogether incapacitated, of other 
criminal groups and offenders in the system.9 
How ‘the most pernicious’ group is defined 
or what is designated as ‘the most harmful’ 
behaviour to be deterred can vary. In the 
United States, where the focused deterrence 
strategies have been adopted, the groups or 
offenders selected for law enforcement actions 
have mostly been either highly-violent gangs or 
chronic or repeat offenders – the dominant goal 
being to reduce violence.10 
However, one can designate other key 
objectives for focused-deterrence approaches. 
Instead of selecting the group with the greatest 
proclivity toward violence as the target for law 
enforcement action and punishment, the priority 
targets can be, for example, criminal groups 
most likely to cooperate with terrorist groups, 
and their engagement with terrorist groups can 
be announced as the basis for striking them.11 
Other groups so selected might be criminal 
groups with greatest capacity to corrupt and 
capture the state’s institutions, or criminal 
groups participating in the most dangerous 
illicit economies such as nuclear smuggling.12 
The broad concept, however, is to move  law 
enforcement forces away from random non-
strategic – at times outright haphazard – strikes 
based merely on random intelligence flows, 
or from blanket ‘zero-tolerance’ approaches 
against lowest-level offenders, and toward 
strategic selectivity and to give each the 
counter-crime operation enhanced impact. 
Often, targeted deterrence is not simply a 
one-step process – i.e., eliminating the most 
pernicious group – but entails a sequential 
approach whereupon the second most 
pernicious group is targeted after the first 
one is incapacitated and then the third most 
pernicious, and so on, so that the robustness of 
the deterrent effect is enhanced and sustained. 
A corollary to hotspot policing that directs 
law enforcement interventions toward 
most violent localities is the geographic 
sequencing and inkspot approach, analogous 
to counterinsurgency inkspot approaches.13 
5Especially in criminal markets where very 
large geographic areas are afflicted by intense 
criminal violence criminality and selecting the 
most violent neighbourhoods is difficult, law 
enforcement agencies may nevertheless pick a 
particular area, establish firm control there, and 
then gradually increase the areas of reduced 
criminality or state predominance vis-à-vis 
the drug trafficking organisations.14 Such an 
approach does not imply a great level of violence 
by law enforcement agencies or most intensive 
strikes against traffickers or their hit men. But 
it does imply establishing preponderance of the 
state’s coercive capacity in the selected locale 
so that the state has the ability to establish firm 
control and increase public safety. In phase two, 
the law enforcement presence is transformed to 
a lighter footprint, such as community policing. 
Heavier law enforcement forces are then sent to 
new areas of intense violent crime.15 The latest 
Brazilian law enforcement approach toward 
the violent slum areas of Rio de Janeiro – the 
Pacification Police Unit (UPP) – is such a de facto 
urban counterinsurgency strategy. It has been 
able to score impressive successes so far, but it 
also continues to face many great challenges.16 
As with earlier Brazilian approaches in a similar 
vein, UPP draws on lessons from policing 
strategies deployed in Boston, USA, in the mid-
1990s (See Box 1).
One of the latest innovations in law-
enforcement focused deterrence strategies 
is to internationalise them. Proposed by Mark 
Kleiman in ‘Surgical strikes in the drug wars’, the 
concept calls for countries with capacious law 
enforcement capacity to disrupt the most violent 
transnational criminal networks in order to help 
reduce criminal violence in other countries 
where law enforcement capacity is weak and 
lacks deterrence capacity.17 Kleiman specifically 
applied the idea to the U.S.-Mexico context, 
suggesting that the Mexican government 
should designate the most pernicious Mexican 
drug trafficking group, i.e., the most violent 
one, and the United States law enforcement 
agencies should strike at, and disrupt, its 
activities on U.S. territory where the Mexican 
DTO	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	 extensive	
drug trafficking and distribution operations. 
Since the U.S. drug market is so lucrative, being 
eliminated from the U.S. drug market would be 
exceedingly painful for the designated group; 
and other Mexican criminal groups would 
then have strong incentives to moderate their 
behaviour and reduce violence in order not to 
draw much attention from U.S. law enforcement 
agencies and preserve their access to the U.S. 
drug market. For such a transnational strategy 
to be effective, the punishment abroad needs 
to be costly to the criminal group – namely, 
the disruption of illicit activity abroad needs 
to generate either large financial losses or 
critical weakening of its logistical channels (if 
India, for example, decided to help Mexico by 
disrupting	 the	 operations	 of	 Mexican	 DTOs	 in	
India, the impact could be negligible because 
the	 penetration	 of	 Mexican	 DTOs	 into	 Indian	
criminal markets is minimal).
Box 1.  Operation Ceasefire and beyond
The focused-deterrence approaches and prioritised-interdiction concepts are to a great extent 
derived from Boston’s fight against violent gangs in the early 1990s, known as Operation 
Ceasefire. The well-publicised targeting of the most violent criminal group and then the second 
most violent criminal group led the Boston gangs to want to avoid being labelled as highly violent 
so as not to become the focus of law enforcement action. Over time, violence in the areas where 
the gangs operated was dramatically reduced, with youth homicide falling by 66 per cent after 
the Ceasefire strategy was put in place in 1996.18
6Building on the Boston Gun Project, the Ceasefire strategy applied problem-solving policing 
to Boston’s youth-homicide problem and prioritised reducing homicides and violence over 
reducing other criminal activities, such as drug trafficking by youth gangs. Under this strategy, 
law enforcement agencies sought to deploy the preponderance of its might against the most 
violent offenders, including by arresting them. That was not difficult to achieve as the violent 
offenses were readily observable and the offenders frequently were subject to outstanding 
warrants or were on probation. The police could thus respond by tightening the supervision of 
probation, serving new warrants, or setting tougher bail conditions, removing juveniles under 
supervision to secure facilities, and reopening cold cases. Law enforcement authorities actively 
sought to advertise their arsenal of punishment tools to gang members and stress that they 
were targeted for their proclivity toward violence. Critically, the strategy hinged on the fact 
that in the Boston and U.S. setting, the characteristics of the chronic illegal activities made 
the most worrisome criminal populations vulnerable to being targeted for the full range of law 
enforcement tactics.19
The ‘pulling levers’ approach, as the tactic came to be known, also entailed involving other 
members of the community, such as churches, schools, and local businessmen, to intervene 
with gang leaders and pressure them to reduce the violence. It included meetings among gang 
bosses, the city’s officials and top law-enforcement officers, and community leaders (whether in 
correctional facilities or school assemblies or through individual contacts with gang members) to 
discuss crime, especially violence, and offer solutions. The focused deterrence approaches and 
mechanisms, such as pulling levers, have been successfully replicated elsewhere in the United 
States, such as in Minneapolis and Indianapolis.20 Operation Ceasefire also became the model 
for similar approaches abroad, such as, for example, in Brazil where the GPAE (Grupamento de 
Policiamentoem Áreas Especiais) policy was implanted in Rio de Janeiro in 2000.21 As 
noted earlier, to some extent, the current UPP policy in Rio de Janeiro for retaking the violent 
favelas is based on the lessons of Boston’s Ceasefire.22 In both of the Rio cases, Brazilian law 
enforcement agencies have prioritised reducing violence among the drug gangs over focusing 
on other criminal activities of the gangs, such as reducing drug trafficking. In the case of the 
UPP, the focus as has been equally on asserting state presence in and control of territories 
previously ruled by the drug gangs. 
Implementation challenges of 
focused-deterrence strategies 
– Beyond U.S. internal law 
enforcement applications
Outside the United States, the implementation 
of the focused-deterrence approach discussed 
in Box 1 has frequently proved to be far from 
smooth and has run into a variety of difficulties, 
with the chosen strategies often not replicating 
the results experienced in the United States. In 
Mexico, for example, the Calderón administration 
ultimately came to prioritise targeting the two 
highly-violent groups – La Familia Michoacana 
and the Zetas – but failed to achieve systemic 
deterrence effects or an overall reduction 
in violence. The government’s tactical gains 
against La Familia Michoacana only translated 
into the emergence of a new, but still highly 
violent group – Los Templarios. Rather than 
being clearly defeated, the Zetas were primarily 
displaced to new areas, including Monterrey 
and Nuevo León and close to the southern 
border of Mexico (they have also set up robust 
operations in Central America).23 Several types 
of implementation challenges have emerged.
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targeting 
The focused-deterrence approach is mostly 
based on deterrence by punishment strategies, 
though it involves an element of capacity denial, 
i.e., the physical prevention of an actor from 
undertaking an action, such as by incapacitating 
the actor.24	Deterrence	by	punishment	is	based	
on the capacity of Actor A (law enforcement 
agencies) to impose such damage on Actor B 
(the criminal group) in retaliation for Actor B’s 
actions (violence perpetrated by the criminal 
group) that Actor B will be dissuaded from 
undertaking the action in the future. A focused-
deterrence strategy can also include extended 
deterrence – seeking to influence not only the 
primarily targeted recipient, but also other, non-
targeted, criminal groups in the system to desist 
from various actions. 
For deterrence by threatened punishment to 
work, the threat needs to contain a clearly-
communicated assurance that if actor B 
(the criminal group) does not undertake the 
action (violence), it will not be punished. Such 
assurance in turn means that law enforcement 
actors are signalling that other illegal behaviour 
(for example, drug trafficking, as opposed to 
violence) will be not punished with the same 
intensity and that ‘well-behaving’ criminal 
groups (not very violent ones, for example) will 
not be the primary focus of law enforcement. 
Yet persuading one’s political constituents 
and perhaps also external allies that going 
easier on some criminals is in fact a sound 
law enforcement strategy, and not corruption, 
requires skilled leadership. In Rio, one of 
the reasons why GPAE ran into difficulty and 
was ultimately abandoned was the political 
controversy surrounding the prioritised focus 
on violence and not drug distribution per 
se. A decade later, Rio’s citizens have been 
far more willing to accept a differential law-
enforcement focus on retaking territories and 
reducing violence rather than combating drug 
trafficking in the favelas and have supported 
the UPP policy. At the same time, however, 
the political sensitivities regarding prioritising 
only certain types of crime have not completely 
disappeared, and Rio’s officials have gone to 
great lengths to describe the UPP effort as also 
disrupting drug trafficking, not merely focusing 
on violence. They have thus at times issued 
conflicting guidelines to the UPP police teams 
inside the retaken favelas as to whether or not 
to focus on disrupting drug distribution there.  
Similarly, during most of the six years that the 
Calderón administration was in power, it had to 
fend off accusations that it was going easy on the 
Sinaloa cartel. Although the Sinaloa cartel has 
been less violent, gruesome, and brazen than the 
Zetas or La Familia Michoacana, going lighter on 
the Sinaloa cartel was perceived by some in the 
Mexican public as favouritism and corruption 
on the part of the government. The Calderón 
administration felt compelled to deny that any 
such differential targeting was taking place and 
undertook actions against the Sinaloa cartel to 
demonstrate that the government’s interdiction 
focus was even-handed, even though such equal 
targeting would intensify violence. 
Scale effects and system complexity
The success of Operation Ceasefire in Boston 
(See Box 1) critically hinged upon the pre-
existing deterrence capacity of the police, even 
though one objective of the strategy was to 
further boost deterrence capacity. The ‘pulling 
the levers’ mechanism sought to highlight to 
gangs the punishment measures the police had at 
its disposal. Moreover, the less violent the system 
became, the easier it was to identify and strike 
against offenders, and hence deterrence capacity 
grew. But critically, even in the initial phases of 
Ceasefire’s implementation, the Boston police 
enjoyed a great deal of credibility with the gangs 
and the gangs feared announced action by the 
police. Thus when the  Police Commissioner Paul 
Evans indicated that he would focus his forces 
on the most violent gang, the gang believed that 
his forces had the capacity to undertake such 
prioritisation and that the gang’s leaders would 
face serious consequences. 
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law enforcement capacity is overwhelmed or 
highly corrupt, is that such credibility is lacking 
– for multiple reasons. One reason may be the 
inability to identify perpetrators of the pernicious 
behaviour selected for deterrence. In Mexico, 
for	 example,	 the	 fracturing	 of	 the	 DTOs	 and	
system-wide escalation of violence muddied 
the intelligence picture. Partly as a result of law 
enforcement	 actions,	 many	 of	 Mexican	 DTOs	
have splintered, new offshoots have emerged, 
and	youth	gangs	have	been	contracted	by	DTOs	
for particular operations, creating an especially 
challenging intelligence environment. Moreover, 
a sense that all enforcement is overwhelmed and 
lacks knowledge of local crime dynamics has 
tempted and allowed criminals outside of the 
major criminal groups, including petty criminals, 
to perpetrate serious crimes, and has given rise 
to the proliferation of kidnapping, extortion, 
and even homicides. Using government data, 
a Mexican non-governmental research group, 
México Evalúa, estimated that between 2007 
and 2010, various forms of crime increased in 
Mexico, including homicides by 96 per cent, 
kidnapping by 188 per cent, extortion by 100 per 
cent, and aggravated robbery by 42 per cent.25 
In 2012, the Calderón administration admitted to 
its lack of investigation capacity and announced 
that it would no longer update its long-running 
count of drug-related deaths because less 
than 10 per cent of crimes in Mexico were 
in fact investigated.26 The multi-polarity of 
Mexico’s criminal market, with many powerful 
criminal groups, makes investigation extremely 
challenging. However, if the perpetrator of the 
pernicious behaviour cannot be identified and 
law enforcement actors cannot meaningfully 
retaliate against it, deterrence collapses. In 
Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s, in 
contrast, the market was bipolar, i.e., essentially 
dominated by two groups – the Medellín and 
Cali	 DTOs	 – and hence a sequential targeting 
strategy there had the luxury of relatively clear 
intelligence of whom to target.
Apart from identification problems, the second 
element upon which effective deterrence 
critically centres is the ability to inflict 
meaningful punishment that the criminal 
group fears. However, if the criminal group, 
such as in Pakistan, believes that it has the law 
enforcement agencies in its pocket or that it 
will be protected by the country’s intelligence 
services or political parties, for example, 
deterrence collapses.
Difficulties in concentrating resources
If the law enforcement apparatus can deliver 
a hefty punch, the credibility of deterrence 
grows. The ability to concentrate resources 
often reduces identification difficulties, by 
enhancing investigation capacities, and thus 
increases the likelihood of punishment. Under 
some circumstances, it can even increase the 
pain of punishment – extrajudicial measures 
aside, a greater density of police officers can 
enable more extensive arrests of members 
of a criminal group and hence more severely 
weaken the group and increase the costs it will 
suffer from misbehaving. 
Yet if resource scarcity, including of law 
enforcement assets, is an acute problem, such 
concentration of resources can be as sensitive 
politically as going lighter on some criminals. 
Areas without ‘treatment,’ i.e., without a dense 
presence of law enforcement officials, will 
question why the selected ‘treated’ community 
where law enforcement assets are concentrated 
deserves such state largesse while other equally 
needy areas go lacking. Political incentives 
push toward the opposite approach of giving 
everyone a little bit, although such an approach 
can undermine and completely eviscerate both 
deterrence and incapacitation capabilities of 
law enforcement.   
It also needs to be noted that badly handled 
increases in law enforcement density can 
generate resentment if the greater presence 
of law enforcement officials triggers and 
perpetuates violence and if the law enforcement 
personnel are abusive and violate human rights.
9Urban spaces where law enforcement 
concentration can quickly produce visible results 
and perhaps even be combined with economic 
development anti-crime interventions producing 
cross-sectoral synergies can provide models of 
success. However, to build the needed political 
support for such resource concentration, it is 
necessary for the state to indicate that it has a 
credible and viable strategy for expanding the 
areas of such multifaceted state intervention 
beyond the original inkspot.
 
Structure of criminal groups and 
transnational deterrence
Deterrence	 works	 best	 against	 hierarchical	
actors with tight control and discipline structures. 
Criminal groups organised as loose networks have 
far less ability to communicate orders to members 
and enforce discipline. The more fractured and 
volatile the chain of command is, including 
when the result of law enforcement decapitation 
policies, the more deterrence signalling can be 
undermined. The chance of rogue elements or 
loosely-affiliated factions striking on their own 
and engaging in unauthorised actions weakens 
deterrence. Law enforcement agencies also 
have far greater difficulty in clearly and credibly 
communicating threats.  
 
The tightness or looseness of structures and 
internal discipline becomes a critical factor in 
internationalised focused-deterrence strategies, 
such as proposed by Kleiman. If Mexican drug 
trafficking groups operating in the United 
States have strong hierarchical structures and 
can enforce decisions and disciplines smoothly 
along the entire chain of its operations on both 
sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, the credibility 
of deterrence actions by U.S. law enforcement in 
the United States increases greatly and actions 
on the U.S. side of the border have a chance 
to	 alter	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 DTOs	 in	 Mexico.	
If on the other hand, the cross-border criminal 
operations are based on loose networks, U.S. 
law enforcement operations against the U.S.-
based	operations	of	the	DTOs	may	have	minimal	
effects	on	the	behaviour	of	the	DTOs	in	Mexico.	
In the U.S.-Mexico case, the evidence regarding 
the tightness or looseness of the criminal group 
structures is, in fact, very mixed (See Box 2). 
Yet another problem with implementing 
transnational focused-deterrence strategies 
is that the national security and public safety 
interests of one country may not be aligned 
at all with such interests of another country. 
Transnational focused-deterrence strategies, 
like other international cooperation for 
incapacitating transnational criminal groups, 
may require that other countries jeopardise their 
arrangements with particular criminal groups 
in ways that the countries may be extremely 
reluctant to do. 
Examples abound. Between the 1940s and 
1980s, Mexico’s law enforcement, for example, 
frequently let various criminal groups operate 
with impunity as long as they did not generate too 
much trouble in Mexico and focused on smuggling 
to the United States. Pakistan has sponsored and 
cultivated criminal and terrorist groups operating 
in Nepal, as well as Bangladesh and Pakistan, to 
engage in asymmetric warfare against India. In 
turn,	 New	 Delhi	 India	 has	 been	 reluctant	 to	 act	
against Indian criminal groups operating in Nepal, 
so as to preserve India’s ability to use them for 
anti-Pakistan and counterterrorist operations in 
Nepal.27 In the latest conflagration of the terrorism-
insurgency-crime nexus – Mali – Algeria has 
been loath to act against terrorist groups and 
criminals operating out of Mali – one reason 
being to avoid provoking any retaliatory actions 
by them in Algeria (this hoped-for outcome has 
not materialised anyway – in January 2013, as a 
possible retaliation for Algeria permitting the use 
of its airspace for the international intervention 
to depose the jihadists controlling northern Mali, 
terrorists seized international hostages at an 
Algerian gas field). These are but few examples 
out of many of the fact that transnational criminal 
groups that may be seen as dire threats by one 
country can be seen as highly useful assets by 
another country, or at least as a low-priority 
nuisance that should not be needlessly provoked 
by law enforcement actions.
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Difficulties in monitoring policy 
effectiveness and analytical inferential 
problems
Like all policies, the focused-deterrence 
approach and selective-targeting strategies 
require careful monitoring and evaluation so 
that law enforcement can optimise the threat 
and nature of punishment as well as the 
design and clarity (or opacity) of the demand-
component of the deterrent signal. Careful 
analytical monitoring also allows for mitigating 
any perturbing effects on the robustness of 
deterrence arising from different institutional 
and cultural contexts within which deterrence 
threats are communicated.
 
Box 2. Structural variation and deterrence effectiveness
When	two	U.S.	agents	of	U.S.	Immigration	and	Customs	Enforcement	(ICE),	Jaime	Zapata	and	
Victor Avila, were attacked and shot in Mexico in February 2011, the perpetrator, later identified 
as the Zetas, apparently actively cooperated with U.S. law enforcement officials and disclosed 
which group members were behind the act.28 The Zeta leadership also claimed that it did not 
know or authorise the attack. Irrespective of whether the latter is actually true, the de facto 
handing over of someone whom the Zetas leadership designated as the perpetrator (or as the 
scapegoat, whichever the case may be) shows that the Zetas had some active fear of U.S. law 
enforcement capacity, and deterrence effects were in fact in play.
At the same time, recent evidence from illicit marijuana cultivation in the United States suggests 
that Mexican criminal groups operating in the United States may possibly resemble far more 
loose networks and atomised actors rather than tightly-controlled chains of operation under the 
thumb	of	 large	Mexican	DTOs,	as	has	been	previously	believed.29 The rapidly-expanding illicit 
cultivation of marijuana in U.S. national and state parks, particularly in California, appears to be 
organised by independent groups of Mexican nationals, often undocumented workers, residing 
in the United States. These groups seem to have minimal connections to and interactions with 
the	large	DTOs.	Also	notable	is	that,	compared	to	other	DTOs	currently	operating	in	the	United	
States, including other Mexican groups, these particular marijuana-cultivating organisations 
have been willing to engage in comparatively high levels of violence against U.S. law enforcement 
agents eradicating the corps, regularly shooting at them as well as tourists in the protected 
parks who wander close to their operations. The continually-expanding plantations and the 
violence indicate that these groups discount the credibility of the U.S. deterrent threats. U.S. law 
enforcement actions against their assets, such as eradication of the plantations and arrests of 
the cultivators, have produced no palpable effects on the behaviour of other criminal groups in 
Mexico. In this case, the deterrence strategies implemented by the United States appear to have 
some	small	effects	on	the	Mexican	DTOs	operating	within	the	United	States	but	their	external,	
transnational,	effects	on	the	DTOs	within	Mexico	appear	to	be	non-existent.
And as with assessments of other types of 
deterrence, evaluating the effectiveness of 
the focused-deterrence strategies presents 
difficult inferential problems and threats to 
validity. Assume that a criminal market in a 
city is highly violent, and that under a focused-
deterrence approach, members of the most 
violent criminal group operating in that market 
are systematically arrested. Subsequently, 
violence	 drops.	 Does	 it	 mean	 that	 the	
focused-deterrence approach was effective? 
Perhaps; perhaps others were deterred from 
perpetuating violence. Violence could have 
dropped, however, for a different reason – 
another criminal group in the city having won 
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in the internecine conflict and established 
firm control over that criminal market, helped 
by law enforcement’s incapacitation of their 
rival. Alternatively, other policing approaches 
adopted at the same time as focused-
deterrence approaches could account for the 
reduction in violence. Or it could simply be 
that the operational tempo of the previous 
strategic warfare among the criminal groups 
was unsustainable and the criminal groups 
burned themselves out, and outside policy 
interventions did not have a strong effect on the 
changes in the pattern of violence at all.
Two real-life examples come from Mexico’s 
Tijuana	 and	 Cuidad	 Juárez.	 During	 a	 large	
part of the Calderón administration, both were 
highly violent and dramatic beacons of the 
drug-related violence in Mexico. Mexican law 
enforcement came to focus on both cities and 
after 2010, violence dramatically declined in 
Tijuana and in 2012, also in Cuidad Juárez. 
Does	this	mean	that	law	enforcement	strategies	
in the cities were effective?
A key explanation of why violence subsided in 
Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana is that in both cities 
one criminal group – the Sinaloa cartel – won 
control over most of the area’s criminal markets 
and smuggling routes.30 Better policing, such as 
the adoption of hotspot policing, and perhaps 
even improvements in Ciudad Juárez municipal 
police under the leadership of Mexico’s 
glamorous cop Julián Leyzaloa, contributed to 
violence reductions in the city. But the 2012 40 
per cent decline in murder rates from the city’s 
peak levels in 2009 and 2010 critically reflected 
the emerging dominance of the Sinaloa cartel. 
Similarly, in Tijuana, the Sinaloa cartel ultimately 
won	the	upper	hand	in	the	DTO	power	struggle.	
During	 the	 military	 operations	 there	 between	
2009 and 2010, the Sinaloa cartel was allegedly 
particularly effective in taking advantage of 
the government-installed hotline to provide 
information on its rivals. In Tijuana too, there 
were improvements in policing, including 
Leyzaloa’s (then heading Tijuana’s municipal 
police) efforts to reduce corruption among the 
municipal police, better coordination among 
the military, the police, and prosecutors, and 
the adoption of rapid responses to reported 
crime, particularly brazen attacks in Tijuana’s 
business centre. But the establishment of a new 
balance of power in the criminal market was 
critical.	Disentangling	the	effects	of	both	policy	
interventions and endogenous changes on the 
criminal markets can be very difficult, especially 
when some of the endogenous effects are long-
term, such as demographic changes in the 
criminal population.
Assessing the extended deterrence effects of 
the focused-deterrence approach on criminal 
groups who are not direct targets is even more 
difficult. Even assuming that a particular law-
enforcement strategy – selective targeting of 
the greatest violator, for example – actually 
produced changes in the behaviour of the 
violator, when and how can it be determined that 
other criminal actors learned from that that law 
enforcement policy? Assume that one criminal 
group is highly violent. Law enforcement 
agencies repeatedly strike against it. Other 
groups in the system, which have not been 
very violent, remain so and do not, for example, 
attempt to seize the territory of the group facing 
the	 brunt	 of	 law	 enforcement	 action.	 Does	 it	
mean that the other groups have learned the 
right lesson from the law enforcement action 
and adjusted their behaviour so as not to 
provoke similar strikes against them? It could 
mean that. But it could simply be that they had 
never intended to escalate violence and seize 
the territory of the targeted criminal group in 
the first place. The only way to establish with 
some level of confidence what explains the 
behaviour of these ‘dogs that don’t bark’ is to 
conduct interviews with the criminal groups’ 
leaders and managers.
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Policy dilemmas in designing 
focused-deterrence strategies 
and side-effects of selective 
targeting 
As outlined above, the objectives set for 
selective targeting and focused-deterrence 
strategies can vary. They can, for example, 
be to reduce violence in the criminal market, 
corruption of state institutions, or the willingness 
of criminal groups to cooperate with terrorists. 
Or the government’s prime objective could be 
to increase state control over criminal groups. 
These different objectives can at times be in 
conflict with one another. 
Different bases of selective targeting 
and focused-deterrence strategies
Even when the most important goal is to reduce 
violence in the system, basic choices need to 
be made. If law enforcement agencies seek to 
reduce violence through the focused deterrence 
approach, they could, and probably should, 
concentrate their attacks first and foremost 
on the most violent criminal group. But they 
might alternatively seek to reduce violence via 
incapacitation – focusing on the weakest groups 
in the system so that one criminal group can win 
in the particular locality. Thus selective targeting 
approaches may generate strategies – focused 
deterrence versus focused incapacitation – 
that compete with one another when it comes 
to designing and resourcing implementation 
strategies. 
Different	 criteria	 on	 which	 focused	 law-
enforcement strategies can be based come with 
different	 costs,	 benefits,	 and	 trade-offs.	Which	
criterion for focused law-enforcement strategy 
to select needs to be assessed with respect 
to local conditions in the particular country 
on the basis of a comparative cost-benefits-
trade-off analysis. Conditions that need to 
be considered in such comparative analysis 
include the distribution of power among the 
various criminal groups, the likelihood of the 
establishment of balances of power under 
different constellations of power distribution, 
the criminal groups’ violence proclivities, 
and the relative strength of law enforcement 
forces, including their capacity for generating 
the necessary detailed intelligence on criminal 
groups and their capacity to impose pain of 
the targets of deterrence or incapacitation, and 
the ability to clearly signal within the particular 
context. If, for example, the law enforcement 
apparatus has a limited capacity to attribute 
individual murders to a particular group, 
the strategy of targeting the group with the 
greatest violence proclivity may not work due to 
insufficient information. Local conditions need 
to inform what targeting criteria are selected 
for focused law-enforcement approaches and 
selective interdiction.
High-value decapitation versus middle-
layer targeting
There is also the dilemma of whether to target 
a selected group’s top leaders or middle-level 
operatives. Targeting low rank-and-file members 
is the least efficacious strategy and mostly only 
results in flooding prisons. Such a strategy 
rarely alters the behaviour of organised crime 
groups or incapacitates them, and abandoning 
such a strategy is an easy choice.
But whether to focus on the middle-layer or 
the top layer is a more difficult decision. High-
value targeting, i.e., focusing on the top layer, 
is often the dominant response in U.S. law 
enforcement operations abroad; and the United 
States often encourages other countries to 
adopt high-value targeting, including through 
the creation of specialised-interdiction units. 
High-value targeting has also become popular 
in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
efforts. In all three settings, it is mostly motivated 
by the premise that high-value targeting will 
incapacitate the group. That may at times be 
the outcome of counterterrorism operations 
against tightly-hierarchical terrorist groups 
(such the Shining Path in Peru). Even when total 
incapacitation does not result, repeated strikes 
13
Focusing law enforcement on the middle layer 
of criminal groups tends to be more effective 
in incapacitating groups and reducing violence. 
Arresting as much of the middle layer at once 
limits the leadership regeneration capacity of the 
group, more severely diminishes its operational 
capacity, and may allow subsequently for more 
effective prosecution of the top bosses (if plea 
bargains with middle-level operatives can be 
struck in exchange for evidence against the high-
value targets). And if interdiction of the targeted 
group stimulates a takeover attempt by another 
group, it is likely to be less violent because the 
criminal group whose middle layer has been 
gutted will have a greatly reduced capacity to 
resist the takeover of its territory and networks 
(it needs to be noted, however, that under some 
circumstances, middle-lever targeting has 
produced unexpected violence. Specifically, 
the targeting of the Taliban’s middle-layer in 
Afghanistan has produced a new generation of 
middle-level commanders which is more violent 
and intransigent and more strongly embraces 
global jihadi ideology).32
However, intelligence-capacity requirements 
for middle-layer targeting tend to be far 
greater than for high-value targeting. Efforts 
to bring down as much of the middle layer 
as possible, especially in one operation and 
thus has a greater incapacitation effect, may 
have to run for several years during which law 
enforcement units must have the capacity to 
identify and follow the targeted individuals, 
preserve and increase intelligence on them, and 
maintain operational security, so that sensitive 
information does not leak out to the criminal 
groups. In the context of highly-corrupt and very 
ineffective police forces, much reform may have 
to take place before law-enforcement agencies 
are capable of going after the middle layers. 
Carefully vetted and constantly re-vetted special 
insulated units will be needed for such a role. In 
contrast, intelligence on high value targets can 
be provided far more readily by external actors 
with extensive intelligence capacity. High-value 
targeting also leads to simpler tactical one-time 
operations, rather than the complex coordination 
against high-value terrorist targets can weaken 
the operational capacity of the group, as has 
been the outcome of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations against al Qaeda. 
High-value-targeting against criminal groups 
have often yielded far less effective and more 
problematic outcomes. One reason is that 
the ability of criminal groups to replenish top 
managers arrested or killed by government 
forces is great in absolute terms, and far 
greater than in the case of insurgencies and 
terrorist organisations, since the leadership and 
organisational skills required of terrorist and 
insurgent leaders tend to be far greater than 
those of drug traffickers. The history of the drug 
trade is one of new traffickers and organisations 
re-emerging each time law enforcement 
agencies appeared to have struck a decisive 
blow to the previously most active groups. 
However, while the regenerative capacity of 
the	drug	 trade	 is	 immense	 and	new	DTOs	 and	
traffickers will always emerge as long as the 
illicit drug market exists- and will persist even in 
legal drug markets as long as law enforcement 
capacity is weak31 – not all the organisations 
and leaders are equally violent and powerful. 
Second, without a clear strategy and an 
anticipation of reverberations in the illicit 
market	of	the	weakening	of	particular	DTOs,	just	
a blanket opportunistic decapitation strategy, 
implemented as information becomes available 
on some traffickers, will simply lead to greater 
turmoil in the market and further turf battles 
among and within the remaining trafficking 
organisations. Consequently, strategic analysis 
by the analytical branches of law enforcement, 
such as analytical sections of specialised 
interdiction units, is as important as information 
gathering. However, more often than not, high-
value targeting stimulates two kinds of violence. 
It can lead to succession struggles and internal 
infighting. It can also tempt other criminal 
groups to seek to violently take over the group’s 
territory and corruption networks. Thus such 
struggles generate severe externalities for 
surrounding communities. 
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operations that middle-layer targeting requires. 
Finally, although of limited effectiveness and 
associated with negative side-effects, high-
value targeting lends itself to government public 
relations campaigns, as captured capos are 
easy to display to TV cameras as proof of the 
effectiveness of government anti-crime policies.
But even though high-value targeting 
against criminal groups tends to be of limited 
effectiveness with respect to incapacitating 
the groups, it may nonetheless be highly 
tempting for law enforcement to undertake 
if the selective targeting is part of a focused-
deterrence approach. The reason is that 
although from an organisational perspective 
hitting the middle layer – especially if a large 
segment of the middle-layer can be removed 
in one operation – is most incapacitating and 
costly, from the perspective of the leadership, 
hitting the top layer is most costly. Thus, if 
law enforcement operatives want to inflict the 
greatest punishment in order to strengthen 
deterrence, they may well be tempted to go 
after the top leaders. That may better induce 
the leaders to negotiate or alter their behaviour, 
but it can also lead to succession struggles and 
only minimally inhibit the operational capacity 
of the group. Leaders can continue running 
their criminal organisations from prisons, and 
even if they do not have the capacity to do so, 
the middle layer can easily provide new leaders. 
The dilemmas of narcopeace
Imagine that the set objective of selective 
targeting and focused deterrence strategies 
was to reduce violence in the criminal 
market. And as a result of law enforcement 
interventions, one group has won and violence 
has subsided – for example, the criminal boss 
Don	Berna’s	establishing	control	over	Medellín	
criminal markets after 2002 as a result of 
Operation Orion undertaken by the Colombian 
government.33 Is that a good or bad outcome?
The emergence of such a ‘narcopeace’ is not 
necessarily detrimental to either the authority 
of the state or the well-being of a community, as 
long as the government takes advantage of such a 
reduction in violence to deepen police presence 
and reform, institutionalise the rule of law, and 
strengthen socioeconomic development for 
marginalised communities – in other words to 
strengthen law and order and beef up positive 
state presence in previously crime-ridden areas 
and marginalised communities.
In fact, during times of intense criminal 
violence, it is extraordinarily difficult to 
effectively implement such efforts. Energies 
of police units become consumed by the need 
to survive and respond to criminal acts, and 
deeper institutional reforms inevitably receive 
fewer resources and attention.
However, to the extent that balances of power 
in the criminal markets are re-established 
and violence consequently falls off, such an 
outcome will only be a success for rule of law if 
law enforcement agencies use the opportunity 
to enhance their deterrence capacity vis-à-
vis the criminals. Although law enforcement 
efforts cannot hope to eliminate all crime or 
stop drug trafficking, they can teach criminals 
that certain actions, such as highly violent 
behaviour, is clearly out of bounds and will 
result in the preponderance of law enforcement 
power bearing down on them. Law enforcement 
efforts also need to teach criminals that they 
have to be prepared to accept such a response 
and not retaliate by shooting up the local police 
precinct or the mayor’s office. In other words, 
the criminals need to be made to understand 
that authority and power lies with the law 
enforcement agencies.
The big danger with violence reduction being 
essentially the result of victory by one criminal 
group rather than of greater effectiveness 
of law enforcement institutions is that such 
‘narcopeace’ is ultimately vulnerable to changes 
in balances of power in the criminal market. 
Without	 strengthening	 law	 enforcement	 and	
better integrating it into local communities, 
such ‘narcopeace’ can be extremely vulnerable 
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to a criminal group’s growth in relative power. 
New criminal challengers can plunge the market 
back into violence, while law enforcement 
institutions continue to lack the deterrent 
capacity to keep renewed power contestations 
from once again visibly and bloodily spilling out 
on the city’s streets.
 
 
Conclusion and 
recommendations
All too often, zero-tolerance approaches 
adopted by countries with weak law enforcement 
institutions have failed to produce desired 
outcomes, including reducing violent crime. 
Even in countries with strong law enforcement 
institutions, such as the United States, zero-
tolerance approaches can lead to greater 
violations of human rights and civil liberties and 
by flooding prisons with low-level offenders, 
impose great costs on societies.
In countries suffering from high levels of criminal 
violence, such as in Latin America, blanket, zero-
tolerance approaches often encourage defining 
the problem in absolute terms – dismantling 
organised crime or stopping illegal drug flows. 
Such goals are mostly unattainable and guarantee 
costly failure. More attainable, yet crucial 
objectives such as reducing the harms associated 
with the drug trade and other organised crime 
– the violence, corruption, and erosion of the 
nation’s social fabric and bonds between citizens 
and the state – are largely ignored. 
Reducing the violence around drug trafficking 
and other illicit economies is particularly 
critical. Societies experiencing chronic and 
uncontrolled violence tend to have little faith 
in government and can transfer their loyalties 
to criminal groups that provide a modicum of 
safety, albeit perverse safety. Governments 
that effectively reduce violence often do not rid 
the country of organised crime but lessen its 
grip on society, thereby giving citizens greater 
confidence in government, encouraging citizen 
cooperation with law enforcement, and aiding 
the transformation of a national security threat 
into a public safety problem.
 
Particularly with respect to transactional crimes 
associated with illicit economies in renewable 
resources, such as the drug trade, reducing 
the incidence of the crimes per se should be 
secondary to minimising the harms stemming 
from the illicit economy. Instead of trying to 
suppress the volume of illegal drug flows, 
governments should seek to minimise the 
violence and corruption surrounding the drug 
trade and societal dependence on the drug 
trade for access to public and socioeconomic 
goods.34
Focused deterrence and selective targeting 
strategies allow for more appropriate goals, 
take into account the harms associated with 
particular illicit economies and law enforcement 
actions to suppress them, and offer attractive 
alternatives to zero-tolerance approaches. 
They allow for the mitigation of some of the 
problems and negative side-effects generated 
by zero-tolerance approaches. They also tend to 
be less resource-intensive than zero-tolerance 
approaches. In the United States, where focused-
deterrence strategies have been pioneered, 
they have produced impressive results. The 
implementation of such approaches elsewhere 
in the world, particularly in areas where law 
enforcement is weak to begin with, has often 
run into difficulties, and their effectiveness has 
been comparatively small. Nonetheless, even 
in such settings, they still provide some of the 
best	 available	 policy	 alternatives.	Designers	 of	
such strategies will need to grapple with some 
acute policy dilemmas that cannot be resolved 
in the abstract and need to take into account 
local circumstances. However, recognising 
the implementation difficulties encountered 
outside of the United States, and the limitations 
and policy dilemmas of such strategies, allows 
for tailoring their design to enhance their policy 
effectiveness even in less than optimal settings.
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of civil society and the business community 
in the law enforcement strategy – should 
also be sought. 
•	 Where the scale and geographical area 
of dangerous criminality is extensive, 
law enforcement agencies should adopt 
‘spreading inkspot’ approaches. But it is 
equally important to seize ‘low-hanging fruit’ 
(i.e. relatively easy law enforcement targets) 
to demonstrate success and build up 
political support for the adopted strategies.
•	 When picking the objectives and bases 
around which focused-deterrence 
strategies and selective targeting will be 
built, law enforcement managers should 
consider carefully the political context, 
the level of pre-existing intelligence and 
enforcement capacity of the government, 
the government’s capacity to concentrate 
resources, the size and scale of criminality, 
the complexity of and power distribution 
in the criminal market, and the structure 
of criminal groups. Consideration must be 
given to how these factors might disrupt 
the effectiveness of the strategies and 
mitigation responses built into the law 
enforcement strategy design.
•	 If violence subsides as a result of new 
balances of power having been formed in 
the criminal market, managers must resist 
the temptation to declare victory and end 
the law enforcement effort. The relative 
calm should be seized to deepen police 
reform, build up intelligence capacity, 
advance community policing, and beef up 
socioeconomic policies focused on crime 
prevention so as to address the root causes 
of crime and violence.
In light of these issues and aware of a variety 
of socio-political environments within which 
police services operate, a number of specific 
recommendations can be made:  
•	 Mindful of the limitations and often damaging 
effects of a zero-tolerance approach, law 
enforcement agencies should consider 
adopting focused-deterrence strategies 
and selective interdiction approaches.
•	 For most transactional crimes, such as 
drug trafficking, the law enforcement focus 
should shift to reducing violence and the 
capacity of criminal groups to corrupt state 
institutions instead of defining suppression 
of flows as the most important objective. 
•	 Policies that further alienate marginalised 
populations from the state and strengthen 
their dependence on illicit economies and 
dangerous non-state patrons should be 
avoided.
•	 Law enforcement strategies should be 
complemented with socio-economic 
development policies targeted to reduce 
crime and populations’ dependence on 
crime. 
•	 Based on local conditions, careful 
consideration must be given to identifying 
what the most pernicious behaviour of 
criminal groups to be deterred is and around 
what objectives to base focused deterrence 
and selective interdiction.
•	 Law enforcement, as well as any 
complementary socio-economic, resources 
must be concentrated as much as possible. 
Cross-sectoral synergies – the involvement 
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Modernising Drug Law Enforcement 
A project by IDPC, with the participation of the International Security Research 
Department at Chatham House and the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Drug	law	enforcement	has	traditionally	focused	on	reducing	the	size	of	the	illicit	drug	market	
by seeking to eradicate drug production, distribution and retail supply, or at least on the stifling 
of these activities to an extent that potential consumers are unable to get access to particular 
drugs.
These strategies have failed to reduce the supply of, or demand for, drugs in consumer markets. 
Given this reality, and a wider policy context where some governments are moving away from 
a ‘war on drugs’ approach, drug law enforcement strategies need to be adjusted to fit the 
new challenge – to manage drug markets in a way that minimises harms on communities. 
A recognition that law enforcement powers can be used to beneficially shape, rather than 
entirely eradicate, drug markets is being increasingly discussed.
The	objective	of	this	project,	led	by	IDPC,	with	the	participation	of	the	International	Security	
Research	 Department	 at	 Chatham	 House	 and	 the	 International	 Institute	 for	 Strategic	
Studies, is to collate and refine theoretical material and examples of new approaches to 
drug law enforcement, as well as to promote debate amongst law enforcement leaders on 
the implications for future strategies.35 For more information, see: http://idpc.net/policy-
advocacy/special-projects/modernising-drug-law-enforcement.
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